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We prove the unconditional security of the original Bennett 1992 protocol with strong reference
pulse. We qualitatively show the dependency of the intensities of the reference pulse on the security
and find that the key generation rate is proportional to the channel transmission rate for proper
choice of parameters.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an art to dis-
tribute a secret key between parties (Alice and Bob) with
arbitrary small leakage of its information to an unautho-
rized party (Eve). So far, several QKD protocols have
been proposed and experimentally demonstrated [1]. In
real life QKD, loss and noises in the quantum channel
limit the achievable distance. In order to cover longer
distances, a decoy state idea for BB84 [2] with weak co-
herent pulses was proposed, which achieves a key genera-
tion rate of order O(η) [3] in the single photon transmis-
sion rate η, whereas it is in the order of O(η2) without
decoy states [4].
Another proposal to achieve longer distance was made
in 1992 by Bennett [5] (B92). In the paper the author
proposed a two-state protocol with strong reference pulse
(SRP), which is expected to be robust against channel
losses. Since the B92 is the structurally simplest protocol
and its essence of security is qualitatively different from
that of the single-photon B92 [6], the security proof of the
B92 is important not only from the practical viewpoint
but also from the fundamental one.
In this letter, we prove the unconditional security of
the B92, assuming two types of detectors. One type can
tell if the photon number ν is ν ∈ λ(D1) = [νi, νf−1], and
the other type can discriminate among vacuum, single-























FIG. 1: (a) An experimental setup for the B92 with SRP. PM
represents a phase modulator. (b) Bob’s side in EDP-B92.
[7] proved the security of a modified B92 with threshold
detectors, but there Bob must lock his own local oscial-
lator to the SRP mode via a feed-forward control, which
may not be easy to implement. The outline of our secu-
rity proof is as follows. We first show how Bob defines his
qubit space, and then we construct an entanglement dis-
tillation protocol (EDP) based on CSS codes [8], which
we call EDP-B92. This protocol will then be shown to
be equivalent to the B92, and the security of the B92
follows that of EDP-B92. In the proof, it is crucial to
estimate the phase/bit error rate from the actually ob-
servable quantities. We solve this problem by identifying
the protocol to be running many protocols of the single-
photon B92 [6] in parallel.
The essence of the experimental setup of the B92
can be expressed by a Mach-Zehnder interferometer in
Fig. 1(a). Alice generates a strong coherent pulse and
splits it into a week signal pulse |√κ〉S and an SRP
|√µ〉SRP (κ ≪ µ). After Alice applies a phase modula-
tion to prepare |(−1)i√κ〉S according to her random bit
i = 0, 1, she sends out the systems “S” and “SRP”. Bob
uses a beam splitter BS1 with reflectivityR ≡ κ/µ, which
splits the SRP into weak and strong pulses. The weak
pulse and the signal pulse interfere at BS2, whose action




aˆSRP + (−1)j aˆS
)
(j = 2, 3),
where bˆj and aˆSRP/S are annihilation operators for the
spacial mode to the detector Dj and the SRP/S mode,
respectively. Bob infers Alice’s bit value to be 0(1) when
D2(D3) records a single photon and D3(D2) records no
photon. Let Λfil,all be the rate of these conclusive events.
Here and henceforth, “rate” is always normalized by the
total number of signals. Among the conclusive events,
only the cases where the outcome of D1 is in λ
(D1) will
be kept and used to generate the final key after clas-
sical error correction (CEC) and privacy amplification
(PA) [9]. Let Λfil,λ′ be the rate of these events, where
λ′ ≡ [νi + 1, νf ] corresponds to the range of the total
number of photons recorded by the three detectors. Us-
2ing random test bits, Alice and Bob monitor the error
rates Λbit,all and Λbit,λ′ of the cases where Alice’s bit
and Bob’s bit are different. Bob also monitors the rate
Λvac,λ(D1) of events where both D2 and D3 records no
photon and D1 reports that the outcome is in the range
λ(D1). Note that in the normal operation with η ≪ 1 and
λ(D1) being wide enough, we should have Λfil,all ∼= Λfil,λ′ ,
Λbit,all ∼= Λbit,λ′ , and Λvac,λ(D1) ∼= 1, but these three rates
must still be monitored to watch out for Eve’s possible
attacks.
Throughout this letter, we assume that all imperfec-
tions are controlled by Eve. Note that D1 with quantum
efficiency η1 and D2 (D3) with η
′ are equivalent to the
setup with unit-efficiency detectors when absorbers with
the transmission rate of η′ and η′′ = Rη′+ (1−R)η1 are
respectively put in S and SRP modes, and the reflectiv-
ity of BS1 is changed to Rη′/(Rη′ + (1 − R)η1). As for
dark counts, we assume Eve can induce dark counts as
she pleases. Thus, we can actually include Bob’s imper-
fections into Eve’s action.
Next, we show that this protocol is equivalent to an
EDP protocol followed by standard measurements. Let
|ν′, ν − ν′〉B ≡ |ν′〉S|ν − ν′〉SRP be the state with ν′
photons and ν − ν′ photons in mode S and SRP, respec-
tively. Note that Bob uses only linear optics and photon
detectors. Thus, it does not disturb the statistics of the
conclusive events to assume that Bob’s measurement
is preceded by measuring the total photon number ν
in modes S and SRP. We denote this measurement as
“P” whose POVM [9] is {∑k+k′=ν Pˆ (|k, k′〉B}ν=0,1,···,
where we write Pˆ (|φ〉) ≡ |φ〉〈φ|. Suppose that ν > 0
is obtained in this measurement. Recall that Bob’s
conclusive events occur only when D2 and D3 receive one
photon in total. It follows that without any disturbance
of the statistics of the conclusive events, P can be
followed by projection measurement “Q” with POVM
{∑i=0,1 Pˆ (|i, ν − i〉B),∑ν′=2,3,···,ν Pˆ (|ν′, ν − ν′〉B)}.
Here, Q decides if the state is in the qubit subspace H(ν)
spanned by |0(ν)x 〉B ≡ |0, ν〉B and |1(ν)x 〉B ≡ |1, ν − 1〉B
(X basis). Let us also define Z basis of this qubit
as {|i(ν)z 〉B ≡ (|0(ν)x 〉B + (−1)i|1(ν)x 〉B)/
√
2}i=0,1. Con-
sidering the transformations at BS1 and BS2, we can
calculate the POVM element for obtaining conclusive bit
i to be Fˆ
(ν)
i ≡ (Gν/2)Pˆ (αν |0(ν)x 〉B+(−1)iβν |1(ν)x 〉B) with
Gν ≡ (1 − R)ν−1(1 + νR), αν ≡
√
νR/(1 + νR), and
βν ≡
√
1/(1 + νR). Let us consider a filtering operation





Gν [αν Pˆ (|0(ν)x 〉B) + βν Pˆ (|1(ν)x 〉B)].
Physically, this filtering operation is performed by BS1
and D1. Since Fˆ
(ν)
i = Pˆ (Aˆ
(ν)†
s |i(ν)z 〉B), we conclude that
Bob’s decision process of the conclusive bit is equivalent
to P, Q, and F followed by Z basis measurement on the
qubit H(ν) (see Fig. 1(b)). For later use, we also define
















FIG. 2: A diagram for the sequence of the measurements.





1−Gνα2νPˆ (|0(ν)x 〉B) +
√
1−Gνβ2νPˆ (|1(ν)x 〉B).
As for Alice’s side, we introduce an auxiliary qubit HA
withX basis {|0x〉A, |1x〉A} and Z basis {|iz〉A ≡ (|0x〉A+
(−1)i|1x〉B)/
√
2}i=0,1. We may assume that she prepares







and sends systems S and SRP to Bob, while she measures
her qubit on Z basis at any time she likes.
Suppose that Alice delays her measurement. In the
ideal case with no noise and no loss in the channel, the
state of HA ⊗H(ν) after P reports ν(≥ 1), Q reports the
qubit H(ν), and F is successful can easily calculated to be
(|0z〉A|0(ν)z 〉B+|1z〉A|1(ν)z 〉B))/
√
2, a maximally entangled
state (MES). Then, Z-basis outcomes of Alice and Bob
would be a perfect secret key. In the presence of loss,
noise, or Eve’s intervention, Alice and Bob do not share
a MES. However, according to an argument by Shor and
Preskill [8], if Alice and Bob succeed in estimating the bit
and phase error rate on the qubit pairs from which Alice
and Bob create the key, then they can distill an almost
perfect MES. Here, the bit (phase) error is for Alice and
Bob to have different measurement outcome in Z basis
(X basis). Moreover, their argument ensures that this
EDP protocol followed by Z-basis measurements (we call
EDP-B92) is equivalent to the B92 with CEC and PA.
Since the bit error rate can be reliably estimated from
test bits, we are only left with the estimation of the phase
error rate from the observed variables. The reason why
we restrict the key generation to the cases with ν ∈ λ′ is
to ensure that this estimation is good enough.
Note that our B92 is similar to performing the single-
photon B92 with parallel qubit channels that will be
treated in the end in a unified way. Since we define the
qubit H(ν) including the vaccuum state of signal mode S,
we are very likely to have a qubit even if we use a highly
lossy channel. This is the main difference from the single-
photon B92, where a qubit loss events are directly defined
by the physical channel losses [6].
In what follows, we derive a good upper bound on the
rate of having a phase error with ν ∈ λ′ in the EDP-
B92. For technical reasons, we bound the rate with λ ≡
λ′ ∪ λ(D1) = [νi, νf ] instead, which is obviously larger





R /∈ λ, and assume that the error
rate is below 50%. As we will see later, working in this
regime suffices for the practical experiments.
3Imagine a sequence of measurements on a pair of sys-
tems, A and (S,SRP), which Alice and Bob share. The
sequence starts with “P” with outcome ν, followed by
projection “Q”. If the state was found in H(ν) (we call
this outcome “Qy”), we apply the filtering operation F.
If F succeeds (“fil”), we apply the Bell measurement [9]
(“B”) to see whether there is a bit error (“bit”) and/or a
phase error (“ph”). If F fails (“fail”), we apply X-basis
measurement on HA (“XA”) to obtain “A0” or “A1”.
Each set of outcomes from these measurements corre-
sponds to a “path” in the diagram of Fig. 2. Consider N
such pairs of systems, and imagine that we repeat this set
of measurements from the 1st pair in order. Let ξ(k) be
the path that was actually taken by the kth pair. We de-
fine lΛ
(l)
Ω,λ (Ω ∈ {bit, ph,A1, fil, fail,Qy}) as the number
of the pairs whose path includes {Ω, ν} with ν ∈ λ among
the first l pairs, and specifically we write ΛΩ,λ ≡ Λ(N)Ω,λ .
Our task is to derive a bound on Λph,λ as a function of
other ΛΩ,λ’s that are easily estimated from the data avail-
able in the actual protocol. To do so, we invoke the fact
that we can assign a joint probability Ppath({ξ(k)}l=1,...N )
for every attack by Eve, since all {ξ(k)} can be mea-
sured at the same time. Then we can apply a known




(l) to include {Ω, ν} condi-














Ω,λ is martingale and satisfies the bounded
difference condition, it follows that for any ǫ > 0 and










Let ρˆ(l) be the maginal state of the lth pair, condi-
tioned on the previous outcomes {ξ(k)}k=1,...,l−1. Then,
we can write n
(l)
Ω,λ = Tr(ρˆ
(l)FˆΩ,λ) by using the cor-
responding POVM element FˆΩ,λ. We have little clue
about the identity of ρˆ(l), but we may find a relation
f({nΩ,λ}Ω) ≤ 0 with nΩ,λ ≡ Tr(ρˆFˆΩ,λ), which holds for
any state ρˆ. If we find such a convex function f , it follows
that f({∑Nl=1 n(l)Ω,λ/N}Ω) ≤ 0, and we obtain a relation
among {ΛΩ,λ} through Azuma’s inequality. For simplic-
ity, we take the limit of N →∞ in what follows. In this
case, the above relation is simply f({ΛΩ,λ}Ω) ≤ 0.
In order to obtain such a function f , we intro-
duce auxiliary parameters nii′,ν ≡ Tr[ρˆPˆ (|ix〉A|i′x(ν)〉B)]





us , we can express the relationship
between yν ≡ (n00,ν , n01,ν , n10,ν , n11,ν)T and zν ≡
(nQy,ν , nA1,ν , nfil,ν , nph,ν)
T as zν = C
−1
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Furthermore, just like the analysis of the single-
photon B92 [6], we can obtain an inequality involving
nbit,ν as |nfil,ν − 2nbit,ν | − 2Gνανβνg(yν) ≤ 0, where




cd. Next, we define C as C ≡
maxν∈λ Cν , where the maximum is taken for each ele-
ment. Using the monotonicity ofGνανβν and the concav-
ity of g in taking the summation of the inequalities over
ν ∈ λ, we have |nfil,λ−2nbit,λ|−2Gνfανfβνf g(Czλ) ≤ 0.
Note that the left-hand side is the function f that we have
just described. We then apply Azuma’s inequality and
we have |Λfil,λ − 2Λbit,λ| ≤ 2Gνfανfβνf g(CZλ), where
Zλ ≡ (ΛQy,λ,ΛA1,λ,Λfil,λ,Λph,λ)T . Finally, by introduc-
ing the decomposion C = C+ − C− with C± composed
of nonnegative entries, and by considering bounds on Zλ
and a lower-bound of the left-hand side, we have the final
expression as
Λfil,λ′ − 2Λbit,all ≤ 2Gνfανfβνf g(C+ZU − C−ZL) , (2)
where ZL ≤ Zλ ≤ ZU , ZL ≡ (Λvac,λ(D1) +
Λfil,λ′ , ω − (1 − Λvac,λ(D1)),Λfil,λ′ ,Λph,λ)T , and ZU ≡
(1, ω,Λfil,all,Λph,λ)
T with ω ≡ 1−e−2κ2 . We note that
if we applied X-basis measurement on Alice’s qubit re-
gardless of Bob’s outcomes, we would obtain the rate
ω of having outcome 1, since Eve cannot touch Al-
ice’s system. On the other hand, the number of pairs
whose path include {fail, ν} with ν ∈ λ is NΛfail,λ,
which is not smaller than NΛvac,λ(D1) . Hence we obtain
ω − (1− Λvac,λ(D1)) ≤ ΛA1,λ ≤ ω, which is used above.
The upper bound of the phase error Λph,λ′ is deter-
mined by inserting the experimental data into Eq. (2)
and searching for the maximum value of Λph,λ satisfy-
















where h(x) = −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x), and G > 0
means that we can distill a new key.
To illustrate the resulting key rates, we consider a
quantum channel that maps Pˆ (|±√κ〉S|√µ〉SRP) into
(1− p)Pˆ (|±√ηκ〉S|√ηµ〉SRP) + pPˆ (|1〉S|√ηµ〉SRP). Here
|1〉S is a single photon state and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. The first
part models loss with transmission rate η, and the sec-
ond part models dark counts since a single photon state
causes a random click on Bob’s detectors D2 and D3.
In order to express the experimental parameters, we de-
fine l as the distance between Alice and Bob, ξ as a
loss coefficient, ηBob as Bob’s detection efficiency, and
Px(ν) ≡ e−x xνν! . We take the experimental parame-
ters from Gobby et al [14], which are p = 1.7 × 10−6,
ξ = 0.21 (db/km), and ηBob = 0.045 [15]. With these
parameters, the probability of the single photon click
event pS is given by pS ≡ e−2ηκ2ηκ(1 − p) + e−ηκp =
Λfil,all, η = 10



























FIG. 3: The key generation rate. See the main text for the
explanations.
It is intuitive that the rate profits from increasing val-
ues of µ because it makes the B92 strong against chan-
nel losses. We can see this tendency in Fig. 3, where
we show log10G for the B92 (solid line) based on our
analysis. We describe the set of data as {(µ, κ, a), la},
where νi = ηµ − a√ηµ, and νf = ηµ + a√ηµ, and la
is the resulting achievable distance (km). In the figure,
(a): {(105, 10−0.92, 3.2), 55}, (b): {(106.59, 10−0.92, 3.2),
100}, and (c) {(1010, 10−0.92, 3.2), 122}. In (b), we have
chosen the minimum value of µ to achieve 100 km. The
difference among (a), (b), and (c) clearly shows the µ
dependency of the key generation rate. With increasing
value of µ the maximal distance grows intitially, and then
saturates. We found that 124 (km) is the maximum dis-
tance among combinations of the parameter set that we
have tried. To see how accurate our phase estimation is,
we plot log10G (dashed line) based on the actual phase
error rate induced by the quantum channel; with param-
eter set (a) we reach la = 136 (km). The poor estimation
partly comes from the nature of the B92 protocol itself
[6], in which the phase error rate cannot be estimated di-
rectly as in the BB84 protocol. Another reason might lie
in the derivation of the inequality, and we might improve
our key generation rate by a more sophisticated analysis.
We also compare the key generation rate of the B92 with
the optimal ones of BB84 based on GLLP (dotted line,
la = 51 (km)) [16] and based on GLLP with infinite de-
coy states (dotted line, la = 163 (km)) [3] assuming the
ideal error correcting code, where we see that the B92
achieves a relatively long distance. Note that since the
analysis of the statistical fluctuations of the decoy states
is very complicated [3], achiving the relatively long dis-
tance without decoy state is an advantage of the B92 over
the BB84 in the practical implementation. In Fig. 3, it is
seen that as we use higher µ, the gradient of the curves
for the B92 approaches to the one of BB84 with decoy
states. This means that G of the B92 is proportional to
η, especially for the high η and large µ.
We have confirmed that if we use larger µ, then we can
choose larger |λ|/ηµ for G > 0. For instance, in the case
of κ = 10−0.92 and l = 50 (km), |λ|/ηµ ∼ 1.60 ∗ 10−1 for
µ = 105 while |λ|/ηµ ∼ 3.47 ∗ 10−1 for µ = 106.59. Note







holds so that our
assumption of working in this regime suffices in practice.
In this letter, we studied the security of the original
B92 with strong reference pulse assuming the two types
of detectors. A qubit state can be defined in the space
where a weak signal pulse contains vacuum and a single-
photon. It follows that even if the quantum channel is
physically very lossy, we still have a qubit state with
high probability, which is the essential difference from
the single-photon B92. We showed G ∼ O(η) especially
for high η and large µ. It is interesting to remove the
assumptions on the detectors, which we leave for future
studies.
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